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COMMENTS
PRIVATE RULE 10b-5 RECOVERY FOR OPEN
MARKET INSIDER TRADING: THE PROPRIETY
OF PRIVITY AND RELIANCE REQUIREMENTS
A split of authority has developed regarding the necessity
of imposing privity and reliance as prerequisites to private
recovery for insider trading in the anonymous markets under
rule 10b-5. Elimination of these requirements gives rise to a
threat of exorbitant damages; imposition of privity and re-
liance requirements solves the damages problem but results
in the abolition of the plaintiff's right to recover under the
rule. This Comment takes the position that the defendant's
rule 10b-5 liability can be limited without eliminating the
plaintiff's recovery. Therefore, imposition of privity and re-
liance requirements is far too drastic a solution and repre-
sents an unjustifiable violation of the policy underlying rule
10b-5o
INTRODUCTION
Rule 10b-51 was prescribed pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).2 By this Act, Congress hoped to
prevent unfair, fraudulent securities transactions in open market
and face-to-face transactions.3 By judicial implication, a private
right of action for recovery of damages resulting from insider trad-
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). The rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
3. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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ing4 exists under rule 10b-5.1
This private right of action is generally preferred over suit under
state law where the rigid restrictions of common law fraud thwart
recovery in most open market situations. 6 Today, the rule 10b-5
action is the most widely used theory of recovery for securities
fraud.'
Because the private rule 10b-5 action is judicially implied, there is
little legislative history to define the scope of the action or the limits
intended by Congress when enacting the 1934 Act. Because of this
uncertainty, a danger now exists that the substantive advantages of
the rule 10b-5 action will be eliminated in open market, nondisclo-
sure situations. A split of authority currently exists as to whether
privity and reliance 8 are prerequisites to recovery under rule 10b-5.
The Second Circuit has eliminated the privity requirement and has
substantially relaxed the causation requirement in nondisclosure
cases.9 The Sixth Circuit rejects the Second Circuit's position and
requires proof of direct causation in fact and privity in open mar-
ket, nondisclosure situations."
Either view creates problems which inhibit the efficient adminis-
tration of the civil remedy implied under rule 10b-5. Elimination of
privity and reliance generates a large number of plaintiffs and
4. Insider trading as used in this Comment means trading a security without
first disclosing material inside information.
5. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). In Kar-
don, the court found support for implication of a civil remedy under rule 10b-5
in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33,39 (1916), in which the Supreme Court
recognized an implied right of action for violation of a federal regulatory stat-
ute. In Texas, the Court held that "disregard of the command of the statute is a
wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from
the party in default is implied." Id.
6. 1 A. BROMBERG, SEcuRTEs LAW: F~uD-SEC RULE 10b-5, § 2.7(1), at 56
(1977).
7. See Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule
10b-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584 (1975).
8. This Comment will consider the terms reliance and causation as synony-
mous. Generally, the courts have dealt with them as such.
9. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d
Cir. 1974). This Comment deals primarily with insider trading in the nondisclo-
sure, impersonal market situation and with resulting rule 1Ob-5 recovery. How-
ever, the Second Circuit has all but eliminated the reliance requirement in
"fraud-on-the-market" and "comprehensive scheme" cases. E.g., Competitive
Assoc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir.
1975); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1974); Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279, 288-89 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
10. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1053 (1977). The Sixth Circuit has imposed a privity requirement. See note 44
infra.
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threatens such enormous damages that the defendant may well be
bankrupted by the award. Imposition of privity and reliance as req-
uisites to recovery resolves these problems, but in so doing, denies the
injured plaintiff a right to recover under rule 10b-5 in the imperson-
al market, nondisclosure transaction. The view which prevails in the
future will determine whether those participating in the impersonal
securities markets must return to the limited-recovery world of
common law fraud."
THBE SECOND Cimcurr's ViEw
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 12 represents
the Second Circuit's approach to the privity and reliance require-
ments. The defendant, Merrill Lynch, had knowledge of material
inside information regarding a poor future earnings forecast for
Douglas Aircraft. This information was disseminated only to certain
Merrill Lynch clients, the majority of whom were institutional inves-
tors (the selling defendants). Prior to public disclosure of the revised
earnings forecast, these defendants sold a total of 165,000 shares of
Douglas stock. On public disclosure of the revised earnings forecast,
Douglas stock plummetted. Shapiro and the other plaintiff investors
had purchased Douglas stock during the period of nondisclosure and
without knowledge of the material inside information.
The plaintiffs brought a rule 10b-5 action alleging trading on
inside information. The district court held that both the tipper, Mer-
rill Lynch, and the tippees, the selling defendants, had violated rule
10b-5 by failing to disclose material inside information prior to the
time the trading took place.13 In affirming the district court's deci-
sion, Judge Timbers announced the policy considerations underlying
rule 10b-5: "As we have stated time and again, the purpose behind
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is to protect the investing public and to
secure fair dealing in the securities markets by promoting full disclo-
sure of inside information ... ,, 4 In furtherance of this policy, the
11. Common law fraud requires the following elements for recovery: (1) a
material, affirmative misrepresentation, (2) privity, (3) reliance, (4) scienter, and
(5) damages. See generally Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659
(1933). See also W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 683-736 (4th ed. 1971).
12. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
13. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
14. 495 F.2d at 235. For the other "times," see Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air
Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); SEC
Second Circuit has developed what is commonly known as the "ab-
stain or disclose rule.' ' 5
This rule, which requires that anyone in possession of material
inside information must either disclose such information or refrain
from trading, applies to open market as well as to face-to-face trans-
actions. 5 Violation of this rule exposes the inside trader to liability
under rule 10b-5. Judge Timbers, speaking for the majority in Shap-
iro, stated that the abstain or disclose rule is based on the "justifi-
able expectation of the securities market place that all investors
trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to
material information."'1 7 Hence, a showing of a violation of the ab-
stain or disclose rule was and is today a prerequisite to recovery in
the Second Circuit.
Originally, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a
"semblance of privity" was also a prerequisite to recovery in a pri-
vate cause of action under rule 10b-5.18 However, in Heit v. Weit-
zen,19 the Second Circuit permitted private rule 10b-5 recovery in the
absence of privity between the parties. The Shapiro court reiterated
that privity between the plaintiff and the defendant was "not a req-
uisite element of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action for damages. '20
The Second Circuit's rationale for the elimination of the privity
requirement lies in the policy considerations announced "time and
again." This policy requires the maintenance of fair dealing in the
open markets as well as in face-to-face transactions.2' Requiring
privity would limit recovery to face-to-face transactions,22 thereby
frustrating this protective policy.
The elimination of the privity requirement did not solve the dif-
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
15. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
16. Judge Timbers stated: "To hold that Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 impose a
duty to disclose material inside information only in face-to-face transactions or
to the actual purchasers or sellers on an anonymous public exchange, would be
to frustrate a major purpose of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws
.... "495 F.2d at 237.
17. Id. at 236 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
18. Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & T.V. Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701,706 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952).
19. 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
20. 495 F.2d at 239.
21. Id. at 240.
22. Id. at 236. Judge Timbers stated that "these transactions occurred on an
anonymous national securities exchange where as a practical matter it would be
impossible to identify a particular defendant's sale with a particular plaintiff's
purchase." Id. Therefore, imposition of a privity requirement would all but
eliminate recovery under rule 10b-5.
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ficult problem of proving reliance in open market transactions. Ini-
tially, the Second Circuit insisted on retaining this requirement.23
However, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States the United
States Supreme Court arguably opened the door to eliminating the
reliance requirement in open market situations.24 Certainly the Sec-
ond Circuit in Shapiro seized upon Affiliated Ute as an opportunity
to do so itself, stating that:
Affiliated Ute surely warrants our conclusion that the requisite ele-
ment of causation in fact has been established by the admitted with-
holding by defendants of material inside information which they were
under an obligation to disclose, such information being clearly mate-
rial in the sense that plaintiffs as reasonable investors might have
considered it important in making their decision to purchase .... 25
In short, a showing of materiality dispenses with the reliance re-
quirement under Shapiro, with the result that reliance is no longer a
prerequisite to rule 10b-5 recovery in the Second Circuit.26
The Shapiro court recognized that eliminating privity and reliance
requirements had the potential to generate a large plaintiff class
which would threaten the defendant with "Draconian liability. 27
The court found this potential liability to be an "additional reason"
for remanding the case to the district court where the "appropriate
form of relief" could be granted.28
The Second Circuit has long been acknowledged as the leading
court in securities regulation. Under the Second Circuit's well-estab-
lished Shapiro rule, the private plaintiff attempting to recover under
rule 10b-5 need only show trading by the defendant on material
inside information, scienter,29 standing to sue under the Birnbaum
doctrine,30 and damages. These limited substantive requirements,
23. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965).
24. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). The Supreme Court held that "[u]nder the circum-
stances of this case, involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of
reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts
withheld be material .... ." Id. at 153. See notes 106-08 and accompanying text
infra.
25. 495 F.2d at 240.
26. Shapiro has in fact eliminated reliance as a precondition to recovery.
Because materiality is a prerequisite to recovery and a showing of materiality
establishes reliance, the latter need no longer be directly established.
27. 495 F.2d at 242.
28. Id. The Shapiro court made no other attempt to deal with the problem of
"Draconian liability."
29. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
30. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952). The Birnbaum doctrine provides that only the actual purchaser
or seller of securities during the period of fraudulent nondisclosure or material
coupled with the vast procedural advantages of the rule 1 Ob-5 cause
of action, 31 make this remedy far superior to any other currently
available under state law.
32
THE SixTH Cimcurr's VIEw
In Fridrich v. Bradford,3 3 the Sixth Circuit dealt with a private
cause of action brought under rule 10b-5 to recover damages for
insider trading in the over-the-counter market. 34 One defendant was
a director of the Old Line Life Insurance Company and a member of a
syndicate which owned a controlling block of Old Line stock. He was
also a managing partner in J.C. Bradford & Co., the market maker in
Old Line stock.3 5 He negotiated a proposed merger with the U.S. Life
Corporation, the terms of which were quite favorable to Old Line.
The defendant relayed this inside information to his son, who pur-
chased 1225 shares of Old Line stock at a price of thirty-seven dollars
per share. Thereafter, the agreement to merge Old Line with U.S.
Life was publicly disclosed and the value of Old Line stock ap-
preciated significantly. The defendant's son sold at a $13,000 profit.
Others who had purchased Old Line stock without first disclosing
material inside information traded in a similar fashion.
misrepresentation may bring a rule 10b-5 private action. Id. at 464. The doctrine
bars three classes of potential plaintiffs: (1) potential purchasers who allege that
they decided not to buy because of the omission or misrepresentation, (2) actual
shareholders who did not sell because of the omission or misrepresentation, and
(3) actual shareholders who allege that the value of their holdings was dimin-
ished because of the defendant's rule lOb-5 violations. The Supreme Court has
approved the Birnbaum doctrine. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723 (1975). See also Note, Securities Law-Rule 10b-5-The Birnbaum
Doctrine is Affirmed: Only a Purchaser or Seller of Secuities May Maintain a
Private Action for Damages Under Rule 10b-5, 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 402 (1976).
31. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976), vests
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts and provides for worldwide service
of process and extremely broad choices of venue. Security for. expenses in
derivative actions is not required.
32. See 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW: FRAuD-SEC RULE 10b-5, § 2.7(1), at
55-56 (1977).
33. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977). See general-
ly Rapp, Fridrich v. Bradford and the Scope of Insider Trading Liability
Under SEC Rule 10b-5: A Commentary, 38 OHIO ST. L. J. 67 (1977); Note, The
Sixth Circuit Drowns the Private lOb-5 Action, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 87 (1977);
Comment, Securities-Rule lOb-5--Traders with Inside Information on the
Impersonal Market Are Not Liable to Those Persons Trading After the Insider
Has Ceased Trading but Before Public Disclosure, 8 Tx. TECH. L. REV. 742
(1977); Comment, Securities Law--Securities Fraud-Proof of Causation in
10b-5 Nondisclosure Cases Involving Trading on Impersonal Markets, 30 VAND.
L. REV. 122 (1977); Comment, Causation, the Duty to Disclose and the Appropri-
ate Bounds of the Plaintiff Class in Anonymous Market Insider Trading
Cases-Fridrich v. Bradford, 1 UTAH L. REv. 150 (1977).
34. 542 F.2d at 311.
35. Id. at 309-12.
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) commenced an
investigation of the trading which occurred prior to the public dis-
closure of the merger. The defendants admitted violations of rule
10b-5 under an SEC consent decree which required the disgorgement
of the son's $13,000 profit and enjoined future violations of rule 10b-
5.36
Fridrich and the other plaintiffs who had sold Old Line stock
during the period of nondisclosure filed a rule 10b-5 civil action
charging insider trading and market manipulation. The district court
held the defendants liable for violating rule 10b-5 and fixed damages
at $361,186.75 irrespective of the fact that the plaintiffs had made no
showing of privity or of direct causation in fact.37
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit did not agree with this
result.38 Judge Engel questioned the propriety of extending recovery
under rule 10b-5 to open market situations when neither privity nor
reliance was shown.39 The court discussed the various policies under-
lying rule 10b-5 recovery in the open market and acknowledged that
the "proscriptions of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 should encompass open
market transactions." 40 In addition, the court stated that "Congress
certainly never intended § 10(b) to be limited in its scope solely to
face-to-face transactions."4 It concluded that inasmuch as the "Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 is aimed at nationwide practices, . . . it
would be idle to exclude from its operation those over-the-counter
and national stock exchange transactions which are most character-
istic of the national market.
4
In striking contrast to the policy espoused and to the admitted
congressional intent underlying the 1934 Act, the Fridrich court
refused to extend the civil remedy under rule 10b-5 to impersonal-
market situations involving material nondisclosure: "[E]xtension of
the private remedy to impersonal market cases where plaintiffs have
neither dealt with defendants nor been influenced in their trading
decisions by any act of the defendants would present a situation
wholly lacking in the natural limitations on damages present in cases
36. Id. at 308.
37. Fridrich v. Bradford, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
9 94,723, at 96,407 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
38. 542 F.2d at 323.
39. Id. at 318-20.
40. Id. at 320.
41. Id.
42. Id.
dealing with face-to-face transactions."4 Thus, in direct opposition
to the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit requires both privity44 and
direct causation in fact as prerequisites to recovery under rule IOb-5.
In an earlier case, Chelsea Associates v. Rapanos,45 the Sixth
Circuit held that a showing of trading on material inside information
presumptively disposed of the reliance requirement. 46 In Fridrich,
Judge Engel reinstated the reliance requirement with relative ease
and with no mention of Chelsea.47 The Fridrich court rejected the
Second Circuit's view that any trading without disclosing material
inside information constitutes a violation of rule IOb-5,48 noting that
the abstain or disclose rule is illogical4 9 because it presumes that the
duty to disclose is absolute.5" Under the Sixth Circuit's view, it is the
43. Id. at 321 (emphasis added).
44. Most commentators to date have not mentioned the imposition of a privity
requirement by the Fridrich court. Rather, they have spoken only in terms of
reliance-causation. See Comment, Securities-Rule lOb-5-Traders with Inside
Information on the Impersonal Market Are Not Liable to Those Persons Trad-
ing After the Insider Has Ceased Trading but Before Public Disclosure, 8 TEx.
TECH. L. REv. 742 (1977); Comment, Securities Law-Securities Fraud-Proof
of Causation in 10b-5 Nondisclosure Cases Involving Trading on Impersonal
Markets, 30 VAND. L. REV. 122 (1977). However, Fridrich arguably stands for
the imposition of a privity requirement. Fridrich declined to allow a private,
civil action "where plaintiffs have neither dealt with defendants nor been influ-
enced in their trading decisions by any act of the defendants." 542 F.2d at
321. If the plaintiff must have "dealt" with the defendant in order to recover,
then he must demonstrate that he was in privity with the defendant. Because the
Fridrich court had previously imposed an absolute reliance requirement, id. at
319, this language is not susceptible to the interpretation that a showing of
either privity or reliance is sufficient. In other words, privity alone could not be
sufficient where reliance is required. The only rational reason for discussing
privity in conjunction with the reliance requirement would be for the purpose of
requiring it. Judge Celebrezze's concurring opinion supports this contention. He
stated that "without at least a 'semblance of privity' defendants' liability could
extend to complete strangers." Id. at 325. One commentator suggests that
[t]he Fridrich court's strict causation requirement appears to reinstate,
albeit in different verbal garb, a requirement of privity in private lOb-5
actions in that, in the court's view, trading will 'cause' damage only to
the person on the other end of the transaction, someone impossible to
identify in the impersonal securities market.
Note, The Sixth Circuit Drowns the Private lOb-5Action, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 87,
97 (1977).
45. 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975).
46. In Chelsea, the Sixth Circuit interpreted Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), as holding that a showing of materiality gives rise to a
presumption of reliance by the plaintiff. 527 F.2d at 1271. For a discussion of this
"presumption," see note 113 infra.
47. Judge Celebrezze did refer to Chelsea in a footnote. 542 F.2d at 325 n.8.
48. Id. at 318.
49. Id.
50. This statement seriously misrepresents Shapiro. District Court Judge
Tenney explicitly stated that the duty to disclose material inside information
arises only "when one in possession of material inside information decides to
trade." Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264,
278 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). In other words, there is a duty to disclose before trading can
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act of trading which alone constitutes the violation of rule 10b-5, and
this act itself must alter the plaintiff's expectations. The defendant's
act of trading must be the direct cause of a plaintiff's injurious
purchase or sale.5' Rule 10b-5 recovery for injury sustained in an
open market, nondisclosure transaction was thus severely limited, if
not entirely eliminated.
The Sixth Circuit had to reconcile its harsh decision with Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States.52 In Affiliated Ute, the Supreme Court
held that reliance was not a prerequisite to recovery in a private
cause of action brought under 10b-5.13 The Fridrich court inter-
preted the Affiliated Ute opinion as having eliminated the reliance
requirement only in face-to-face transactions and not in impersonal-
market situations. Therefore, the court ruled that Affiliated Ute did
not apply to the facts in Fridrich.5 4
The Fridrich court justified the rejection of the Second Circuit's
view and the resulting imposition of the privity and direct causation
requirements on several grounds. First, the court felt that failure to
impose these requirements would lead to an "unjust and unworkable
result" 55 by generating numerous plaintiffs who would be compens-
able at the expense of a defendant whose trading had not caused
their losses. Furthermore, the court reasoned that although its deci-
sion would arguably decrease the deterrent impact of rule 10b-5,
SEC sanctions authorized by the 1934 Act, coupled with available
remedies at state law, would have a "significant impact" on insider
misconduct.56 However, the Fridrich court refused to decide whether
this "significant impact" would sufficiently deter insider trading,51
noting that a "similar" deterrence argument was held "unpersuasive
by the Supreme Court in Bangor Punta Operations v. Bangor & A.R.
Co. "058
occur, giving the insider the option either to disclose or to refrain from trading.
Thus, the duty is not "absolute" but conditional. Oddly enough, Judge Cele-
brezze noted in his concurring opinion that "I do not read today's decision as a
repudiation of the 'disclose or abstain rule' in private damage actions." Fridrich
v. Bradford, 542 F.2d at 323.
51. 542 F.2d at 318-19.
52. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
53. Id. at 153.
54. 542 F.2d at 319-20. For further discussion of differing interpretations of
Affiliated Ute, see notes 104-18 and accompanying text infra.
55. 542 F.2d at 320.
56. Id. at 321-22.
57. Id. at 322.
58. Id. at 321. In fact, the argument was not at all similar. Bangor Punta
Elimination of the threat of "Draconian liability"5 9 in the open
market situation was also cited as justification for narrowing the
civil remedy under rule 10b-5. Exorbitant damages, the court held,
would "creat[e] a windfall for those fortuitous enough to be aware of
their nebulous legal rights, and impos[e] what essentially must be
considered punitive damages almost unlimited in their potential
scope."60
At the outset of the opinion, Judge Engel announced the primary
issue before the court. "In the final analysis, the question is how far
the courts are to extend the private civil right of action under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when the alleged violation is the unlawful use
of inside information and the stock involved is traded upon an imper-
sonal market." 61 The court held that recovery would not be extended
to those situations where privity and reliance were not proven.6 2 Yet,
Judge Engel refused to hold that the civil remedy under rule 10b-5
would be extended to impersonal market situations even where di-
rect causation in fact was established.6 3
AN ANALYSIS OF F IDRICH
The Fridich approach to the private right of action under rule
10b-5 is the antithesis of the Second Circuit's approach. The latter
view concededly creates difficulties in administering the rule 10b-5
action in the impersonal market arena. The size of the plaintiff class
generated by the elimination of privity and reliance requirements,
and the defendant's corresponding liability, may well be enormous.
Frdrich dealt with these problems in an interesting manner. Rather
than preserve rule 10b-5 recovery and minimize the defendant's
liability by fashioning appropriate relief, the Sixth Circuit chose to
eliminate the plaintiff's right of recovery altogether.
This approach seems too simplistic. Although there is no prob-
lem with excessive damages when there is no right of recovery, the
Operations v. Bangor & Aroostook Rwy. Co., 417 U.S. 703 (1974), did not deal
with insider trading. The decision involved a rule lOb-5 private damage action
alleging corporate mismanagement. The plaintiff sought to recover the
$5,000,000 it had paid for the stock of the subsidiary and additionally sought to
keep this stock. The Supreme Court refused to extend 10b-5 liability to this
extreme. Hence, the Court had no reason to pass on the deterrent effect of a rule
10b-5 action for insider trading, and therefore it did not rule on this issue.
59. 542 F.2d at 309.
60. Id. at 321. Judge Celebrezze offered the identical justification in his
concurring opinion. Id. at 323 (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 314.
62. Id. at 320.
63. Id. at 320 n.27. The court stated that "(w]e specifically do not reach the
question of availability of the remedy to open market situations where the
insider trading with resultant price changes has in fact induced the plaintiffs to
buy or sell to their injury." Id.
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plaintiff is left in the unfortunate position of having no redress for
the injury incurred by reason of the defendant's insider trading on
the open market. The Fridrich court justified the eradication of the
plaintiff's right of recovery on several grounds. The validity of the
Fridrich decision can be tested only on the strength of those justifi-
cations proffered by the court.
SEC Enforcement Activities and Recovery Under State Law
One justification for the abolition of the plaintiff's right of rule
10b-5 recovery in open market situations was the court's belief that
SEC proceedings coupled with state remedies would significantly
deter insider misconduct occurring in the anonymous markets.
6 4
However, it is doubtful that the SEC has the ability to litigate the
number of private rule 10b-5 actions currently on the court's dock-
ets.65 The SEC is understaffed and operates on a limited budget. For
example, the SEC's New York Regional Office is manned by a staff of
fewer than 185 people and operates on a budget of less than
$3,000,000.66 Mr. Moran, the supervisor of the New York office in
1974, was not optimistic about curbing securities frauds: "The in-
genuity and crookedness of mankind never ceases. . . .I never know
what mankind is going to do next. ' 67 Furthermore, the SEC is not a
private collection agency. The SEC functions more effectively under
rule 10b-5 by placing emphasis on disciplinary and investigatory
proceedings "unaccompanied by novel claims for restitutionary re-
lief."6
8
The SEC has no power to levy fines or to force people or commer-
cial entities to surrender profits obtained in violation of rule 1Ob-5.69
However, disgorgement of profits has been granted by the federal
64. Id. at 321-22.
65. Note, Damages to Uninformed Traders-for Insider Trading on Imperson-
al Exchanges, 74 COLUMv. L. REV. 299, 316 (1974).
66. Kohn, New York Office Monitors Activity with Staff of 185, in 2 SEC '74,
at 237, 237 (1974).
67. Id., at 239.
68. W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 150 (1968). A few
commentators favor a restitutionary approach by the SEC. See 3 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1828-29 (2d ed. 1961); Cary, Book Review, 75 HARv. L.
REV. 857, 861-62 (1962) (referring to claims under § 5 and § 17 of the 1934 Act but
implying that the same should be true under rule 10b-5).
69. Ratner, Federal and State Roles in the Regulation of Insider Trading, 31
Bus. LAW. 947, 954 (1976).
courts in the form of ancillary relief.70 Although the SEC continually
increases its enforcement activities, the number of securities frauds
rises at an astounding rate.71 The net result is that those investors
actually injured by insider trading when dealing on the impersonal
markets cannot be adequately compensated by SEC anti-fraud ac-
tivity.
State law is of little more assistance in curbing fraud in the open
markets. 2 Those jurisdictions enforcing the rigid requirements of
common law fraud essentially eliminate recovery in impersonal mar-
ket situations to the same extent as has Fdrich. 73 Furthermore,
although the "special circumstances rule," which some jurisdictions
apply, eliminates the requirement of a material, affirmative misre-
presentation, it nonetheless retains the requirements of privity and
reliance.74
The most liberal state law approach was taken by the New York
Court of Appeals in Diamond v. Oreamuno.75 This case involved a
shareholder's derivative suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty by the
President and Chairman of the Board. The defendants had used
inside information to reap short-swing profits. The court in essence
applied section 16(b) of the 1934 Act. 76 Under section 16(b), if a ten-
percent shareholder, a director, or an officer of a company makes a
profit on the purchase and sale or sale and purchase of the company's
securities within a six-month period, the profit must be returned to
the issuing company. Because the defendants in Diamond were
either directors or officers, the New York Court of Appeals required
the return of their profits to the corporation. However, the validity of
Diamond is certain only in New York. 77 Furthermore, the section
70. E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, remanded in part, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971).
71. Note, The SEC and the Individual Investor: Restoring His Confidence in
the Market, 60 VA. L. REv. 553, 577 (1974).
72. See Ratner, Federal and State Roles in the Regulation of Insider Trad-
ing, 31 Bus. LAW. 947 (1976) ("If there is an appropriate place for state law in
[the area of insider trading] it should apply to those cases of essentially local
concern ... ." Id. at 948).
73. E.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). Commen-
tators have frequently recognized the necessity of departure from the rigid
requirements of common law fraud if the ultimate goals of the securities laws
are to be accomplished. See, e.g., 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIEs LAW REGULATION §
8.4(513), at 204.115 (1977).
74. E.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Fox v. Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371,
159 P.2d 224 (1945).
75. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
77. See Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739, 746 (Fla. 1975), where the Florida
Supreme Court rejected the "innovative ruling of the New York Court of Ap-
peals" in Diamond.
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16(b) theory of recovery returns profits to the corporation and is of no
benefit to the private plaintiff who seeks to recover personally for
injuries occasioned by the defendant's inside trading.
The impact of state law remedies coupled with SEC activities is
not so "significant" as to warrant abolition of the private right of
action under rule lOb-5. Even if state substantive law were to devel-
op judicially implied actions similar to those under rule 10b-5, the
Fridrich contention would still be only partially correct because the
procedural advantages of rule 10b-5 are far greater than those exist-
ing under state law.
If securities frauds are to be minimized, the use and deterrent
effect of the private right of action under rule 10b-5 must be max-
imized. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,78 Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the majority, stated that " '[p]rivate enforcement'
of Commission rules may [provide] a 'necessary supplement' to SEC
action."7 9 Such "private enforcement" relating to activities on na-
tional markets should be vested in a single, nationwide judiciary to
preserve uniformity in securities law as well as in the availability of
recovery. The federal courts, enforcing federal securities law, are far
better equipped to handle this task than are the various state
courts.80
Elimination of Excessive Damages
The Sixth Circuit also justified the imposition of privity and causa-
tion requirements as a necessary measure to avoid effectively the
threat of "Draconian" damages.8 1 However, in the process, rule 10b-5
recovery in open market situations was eliminated. As discussed
above, the Second Circuit's deletion of privity and reliance as requi-
sites to recovery under rule 10b-5 brought this "threat" into exist-
ence. 82 The Shapiro court dealt with this damages problem by re-
manding the case to the district court for "appropriate relief.
83
Neither method of dealing with the damages issue is really sufficient,
78. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
79. Id. at 730 (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)).
80. See Ratner, Federal and State Roles in the Regulation of Insider Trad-
ing, 31 Bus. LAw. 947 (1976). ("Federal law should become the exclusive source
of sanctions against insider trading in publicly held corporations, not by formal
preemption of state law, but by providing a rational and workable system of
sanctions that makes state remedies superfluous." Id. at 948.).
81. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d at 321.
82. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
83. 495 F.2d at 242.
although the Shapiro rule does not include the elimination of all
recovery, as does Fridrich's novel approach.
Throughout the development of civil remedies under rule IOb-5 the
federal courts have used three different measures of damages: 84 the
"rescision" measure, which restores to the plaintiff the difference
between the price at which he bought or sold and the value of the
stock at the time of suit; 5 the "out-of-pocket" measure, which re-
turns to the plaintiff the difference between the price paid and the
real value at the time of purchase had disclosure been made;86 and
the "expedient out-of-pocket" measure, defined as the difference
between the purchase price and the actual market price a reasonable
time after the nondisclosure has been cured.
87
The application of any one of these measures to the large plaintiff
class generated by the elimination of privity and reliance require-
ments could result in potentially enormous damages. For example,
the damages under rule 10b-5 following the collapse of Equity Fund-
ing were estimated to have been in the vicinity of $800,000,000.88
Damages in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 89 were thought to be as
high as $75,000,000, not all of which was attributable to insider
trading.90 Although the tendency toward settlement has been great,
and therefore, relatively few cases have reached the relief stage,91
still the threat of enormous liability exists. Neither Shapiro nor
Fridrich dealt with this threat in a satisfactory manner. The question
is whether this "threat" can be eliminated without denying rule lOb-
5 recovery in open market, nondisclosure situations.
The American Law Institute (ALI) has proposed a measure of
84. On the issue of damages, see Note, Damages to Uninformed Traders for
Insider Trading on Impersonal Exchanges, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 299 (1974); Note,
The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Secu-
rities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371 (1974).
85. E.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965); All States Investors, Inc.
v. Bankers Bond Co., 343 F.2d 618 (6th Cir. 1965).
86. E.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972);
Estate Counseling Serv. Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303
F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962).
87. E.g., Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1054 (1976); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded in part, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
88. Note, Damages to Uninformed Traders for Insider Trading on Imperson-
al Exchanges, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 306 n.67 (1974).
89. 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded in
part, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
90. Note, Damages to Uninformed Traders for Insider Trading on Imperson-
al Exchanges, 74 CoLum. L. REV. 299, 306 n.67 (1974).
91. See 4 A. BROMBERG, SEcurrixs LAw: FRAuD-SEC RULE lOb-5, § 9.1, at
225 (1977).
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damages specifically for private 10b-5 insider trading actions.9 2 This
proposed measure would fix the defendant's maximum liability at
the greater of the plaintiff's out-of-pocket damages per share multi-
plied by the number of shares purchased or sold by the defendant or
the defendant's profit on his sale or purchase.9 3 The ALI has also
proposed a measure of damages applicable to cases involving the
filing of false registration statements under section 11 of the 1933
Act, which appears to be a viable-if not superior-measure for rule.
10b-5 insider trading actions. This provision would limit the defen-
dant's liability to the greater of $100,000, one percent (to a maximum
of $1,000,000) of gross income in the defendant's last fiscal year, or
the defendant's profit on the trade. 4 In either case, the ALI proposed
code provides that whenever a second action is filed against the
defendant for the same violation, every court in which such action is
pending shall stay the proceeding and submit the record or records
before it to the judicial panel on multi-district litigation.95
By employing measures similar to those proposed by the ALI, the
threat of "Draconian liability" can be eliminated by imposition of a
ceiling on the defendant's liability. In fact, the plaintiff in Fridrich
suggested that an ALI measure of damages9 6 be applied in that case97
to avoid unlimited liability. Judge Engel rejected this suggestion on
the grounds that the "courts are ill-fitted to the task of rulemaking
which would be required." 98 However, there appears to be little or no
judicial support for Judge Engel's contention.9
The Supreme Court on several occasions has acknowledged the
power of the federal courts to fashion the right of recovery as well as
the necessary relief for violation of a federal regulatory statute. 00 In
Affiliated Ute, the Court stressed that Congress intended securities
legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed
"not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its reme-
92. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1402(f) (Reporter's Revision of Text of
Tentative Draft No. 2, 1973).
93. Id.
94. Id. § 1403(g).
95. Id. § 1409(c).
96. Id. § 1402(f)B).
97. 542 F.2d at 322.
98. Id.
99. Judge Engel cited no authority in support of this contention. Id.
100. See 4 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAuD--SEC RULE lOb-5, § 9.2, at
231 (1977).
dial purposes."'' In J.L Case Co. V. Borak,1°2 the Court held that "[ilt
is for the federal courts 'to adjust their remedies so as to grant the
necessary relief, where federally secured rights are invaded.' ",103 The
Fridrich court either ignored or was unaware of the above Supreme
Court authority in declining to serve in a "rulemaking" capacity.
The reasoning set forth in Fridrich as justification for imposing
both privity and reliance as prerequisites to recovery under rule 10b-
5 is suspect. The SEC and state courts are not adequately equipped to
curb fraud in the securities markets. The threat of "Draconian liabil-
ity" can be eliminated by fashioning an appropriate measure of
damages without denying a right of recovery under rule 10b-5 in
impersonal market situations. Finally, the federal courts have both
the ability and the Supreme Court's authorization to fashion this
relief.
Affiliated Ute: The Source of Confusion?
The imposition of the reliance requirement by the Fridrich court
was not only unjustified but was also contrary to the weight of
authority. Both Shapiro0 4 and Fridrich10 5 cited the Supreme Court's
decision in Affiliated Ute as controlling. Yet, each court reached an
entirely different result as to whether a showing of reliance
was a prerequisite to recovery under rule 10b-5.
Affiliated Ute involved a deliberate scheme on the part of the
defendant bank employees to induce the plaintiff Indians to sell their
stock. The resulting sales were made without the benefit of material
inside information which the defendants had failed to disclose. The
Court ruled that the defendants were properly held liable under rule
10b-5 even though reliance had not been proven.
One portion of the holding has been a source of confusion in rule
10b-5 suits: "Under the circumstances of this case, involving primar-
ily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite
to recovery."'0 5 The Sixth Circuit in Fridrich interpreted this pas-
sage as requiring positive proof of reliance in impersonal-market
transactions while dispensing with that requirement in face-to-face
transactions. 0 7 Under this interpretation, the phrase "under the cir-
101. 406 U.S. at 151 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S.
180, 186 (1963)).
102. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
103. Id. at 433 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
104. 495 F.2d at 240.
105. 542 F.2d at 319-20.
106. 406 U.S. at 153.
107. 542 F.2d at 319-20. Judge Engel stated that "[t]he type of relationship
existing between the plaintiffs and defendants in Affiliated Ute is totally absent
here." Id. at 320.
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cumstances of this case" limits the Affiliated Ute holding solely to
the face-to-face transactions which were involved in the case.
The Shapiro court, on the other hand, cited the holding in Af-
filiated Ute as warranting the conclusion that "causation in fact has
been established" by a showing of trading on material inside infor-
mation. 10 8 Thus, in the Second Circuit reliance is no longer a prereq-
uisite to recovery under rule 10b-5 in face-to-face or in impersonal
market transactions.
An objective analysis of the disputed passage weighs heavily in
favor of the Shapiro approach. Immediately following this passage,
the Supreme Court cited Bromberg's treatise on securities fraud,109
where Bromberg stated: "Alternatively, reliance may be presumed
from materiality. . . , and it makes sense; once the latter is shown,
the reasonably prudent investor would be expected to rely." 0 The
Court also referred to Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co.,"' where the
Second Circuit held that "[c]ausation in fact or adequate reliance
was sufficiently shown" by proof of the defendant broker's recom-
mendation to purchase without disclosure of a material fact." 2
The fact that the above authorities were cited following the dis-
puted passage in Affiliated Ute, coupled with the reasonable in-
terpretation that the "circumstances of this case" referred to a case
involving "primarily a failure to disclose,"' indicates that the
Shapiro interpretation is the most accurate. Furthermore, in Mills v.
Electric Auto Lite Co. ,"4 the Supreme Court held that "[w]here there
has been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a sufficient
showing of causal relationship between the violation and the injury
for which he seeks redress."'1 Thus, definite support exists for the
Shapiro view.
Since Affiliated Ute was decided, the vast majority of lower courts
108. 495 F.2d at 240.
109. 406 U.S. at 154.
110. 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE 10b-5, § 8.6(2), at 212
(1977).
111. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
112. Id. at 1172.
113. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 153. Judge Timbers so
interpreted Affiliated Ute in Shapiro. He stated that "[the] rule [in Affiliated
Ute] is dependent not upon the character of the transaction-face-to-face versus
national securities exchange-but rather upon whether the defendant is ob-
ligated to disclose the inside information." 495 F.2d at 240.
114. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
115. Id. at 385.
have followed the Shapiro view either by adopting a presumption
that causation in fact is established on a showing of trading without
disclosure of material inside information" 6 or by eliminating the
causation requirement altogether." 7 The Sixth Circuit, by requiring
proof of reliance, decided contrary to the great weight of judicial
authority." 8
PoucY CONSIDERATIONS
The soundness and value of both Shapiro and Fridrich should also
be judged in terms of the policy underlying the private right of action
under rule 10b-5." 9 The Supreme Court on a number of occasions has
attempted to define the parameters of this policy, which was set forth
most vividly in Superintendent of Insurance v. Banker's Life & Casu-
alty Co. 12o Justice Douglas stated:
Hence we do not read § 10(b) as narrowly as the Court of Appeals; it is
not 'limited to preserving the integrity of the securities markets
.. ,[1211 though that purpose is included.
...[Wle read § 1O(b) to mean that Congress meant to bar deceptive
devices and contrivances in the purchase or sale of securities whether
conducted in the organized markets or face to face.122
The Supreme Court's position on the policy underlying the private
116. E.g., Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975); Blackie
v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402
(3d Cir. 1974); Reeder v. Mastercraft Elec. Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Taylor v. Smith, Barney & Co., 358 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Utah 1973). These
courts have interpreted the Affiliated Ute decision as setting forth a "presump.
tion" that positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. However,
the word "presumption" does not appear in Affiliated Ute, as was noted in
Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 400 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
117. See Davis v. Avco Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782, 792 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
118. One other court has held, without mentioning Affiliated Ute, that the
reliance requirement still exists. Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
119. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), in
which Justice Rehnquist stated:
When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a
judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.
Such growth may be quite consistent with the congressional enactment
and with the role of the federal judiciary in interpreting it, . . . but it
would be disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942 foreordained the present
state of the law with respect to Rule lOb-5. It is therefore proper that we
consider... what may be described as policy considerations when we
come to flesh out the portions of the law with respect to which neither
congressional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer
conclusive guidance.
Id. at 737 (emphasis added).
120. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
121. Justice Douglas was quoting from the court of appeals opinion. 430 F.2d
355, 361 (2d Cir. 1971).
122. 404 U.S. at 12 (emphasis added).
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right of action under rule 10b-5 is quite clear: The private right of
action under rule 10b-5 is to function as a "necessary supplement to
Commission action"'2 3 while simultaneously encouraging enforce-
ment of the securities exchange provisions in the "organized markets
or face-to-face.' 211 4 The primary purpose of the private right of action
is to compensate plaintiffs for damages caused by the defendant's
illegal acts.2 5 The Fridrich approach to rule lOb-5 in open market,
nondisclosure situations is so restrictive that in most cases an injured
plaintiff is denied any right of recovery under the rule. The results of
the imposition of privity and reliance requirements are diametrically
opposed to the policy considerations set forth by the Supreme Court.
The Court never chose to eliminate recovery under rule 10b-5 in
open market situations while administering relief in face-to-face
transactions. 2 6 Yet, the holding in Fridrich has accomplished this
result. The Sixth Circuit has been unable to justify adequately this
departure from the policy considerations and from the judicial au-
thority supporting rule lOb-5.
Shapiro does not differentiate between open market and face-to-
face transactions but grants relief to any injured plaintiff. Thus,
Shapiro is far more conducive to achieving the policy underlying rule
10b-5 and its implied private right of action. Liability extends to any
purchase or sale of securities involving material nondisclosure. The
elimination of privity and reliance poses a potential threat of
"Draconian liability." However, the federal courts can avoid this
threat in the future by following those measures set forth by the
ALI.127
CONCLUSION
Prior to Fridrich an investor was no less worthy of protection
under rule lOb-5 because he had dealt on an impersonal exchange
than he would have been had he conducted a face-to-face transac-
tion. Following the Fridrich holding, the plaintiff is denied a right of
recovery in impersonal market situations on the ground that the
defendant, who has admittedly violated rule 10b-5, must be protect-
123. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
124. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,12 (1971).
125. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d at 314.
126. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971).
127. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE §§ 1402(f), 1403(g) (Reporter's Revision of
Text of Tentative Draft No. 2, 1973).
ed from excessive liability. However, the reasoning of Fridrich is
fallacious in two respects. First, the law ought not protect the wrong-
doer at the expense of the injured party; rather, the reverse should be
true. Second, the defendant's liability can easily be limited without
denying the plaintiff's private recovery under the rule.
As a practical matter, proof of the existence of privity between
plaintiff and defendant in the impersonal market transaction is
virtually impossible. 128 Reliance is even more difficult to establish. If
these requirements are imposed, the private remedy under rule 1Ob-5
is effectively eliminated in the anonymous market situation. No lon-
ger could private enforcement of rule 10b-5 serve as a "necessary
supplement"'' 9 to SEC enforcement activities. The deterrent effect of
rule 10b-5 would be diminished to a state of debilitation, and securi-
ties frauds could with impunity increase in geometric proportions
rather than at the current "astounding rate."'13 0
If the defendant is to be held liable for violation of rule IOb-5 in the
open market transaction, and if the plaintiff is to be protected from
securities frauds, recovery under the rule must not be conditioned
upon privity and reliance. The Second Circuit wisely discards the
privity requirement and significantly relaxes the causation element.
To do otherwise returns the investor to the limited-recovery world of
common law fraud, immunizes the defendant from civil liability, and
seriously frustrates the policy underlying section 10(b) of the 1934
Act, rule 10b-5, and the concomitant implied right of action.
CLYDE C. GREco, JR.
128. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236
(1974).
129. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,730 (1975) (quoting
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)).
130. Note, The SEC and the Individual Investor: Restoring His Confidence
in the Market, 60 VA. L. REV. 553, 577 (1974).
